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WORKPLACE CYBERHARASSMENT:  
EMPLOYER AND WEBSITE OPERATOR LIABILITY  
FOR 
 ONLINE MISCONDUCT 
 
by 
 
John Paul 
 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
 Harassment is a serious problem in the United States 
(U.S.) workplace. One widespread definition of workplace 
harassment is “repeated and persistent attempts by one person 
to torment, wear down, frustrate or get a reaction from another. 
It is treatment which persistently provokes, pressures, 
frightens, intimidates or otherwise discomforts another 
person.”1 While workplace harassment may be immoral and 
unprofessional, it is not universally illegal in the U.S. 
workplace for employers to insult, humiliate, ignore or mock 
employees; furthermore, it is not illegal to gossip, spread 
rumors or take credit for someone else’s work. Unfortunately, 
these types of workplace harassment take place with distressing 
frequency.2 
 
 Several recent studies confirm the seriousness of 
workplace harassment in the U.S. A March 2007 survey of 
1,000 U.S. employees conducted by the Employment Law 
Alliance revealed that 45 percent of respondents reported 
working for abusive bosses. A September 2007 poll sponsored 
by the Workplace Bullying Institute (consisting of 7,740 online 
                                                          
 Clinical Assistant Professor of Accounting/Legal Studies and Taxation, 
Lubin School of Business, Pace University, New York, NY  
2015 / Workplace Cyberharassment / 2 
interviews) estimated that 37 percent of U.S. workers (about 54 
million people), would report being bullied in the workplace. 
In a 2008 study conducted by the Society for Human Resource 
Management and the Ethics Resource Center, 57 percent of the 
513 participants reported that they had witnessed “abusive or 
intimidating behavior toward employees,” excluding sexual 
harassment (Daniel 2009).3 
 
 Workplace bullies can be identified by a number of 
characteristics: (1) frequent misuse of authority; (2) focus on 
personal self-interest, as opposed to the good of the 
organization; (3) inconsistency and unfairness in the treatment 
of employees; and (4) prone to emotional outbursts. Bullies 
engage in actions that are perceived as being overwhelmingly 
negative. These negative actions include: (A) a need for 
control, exploitation, intimidation, humiliation and 
embarrassment; (B) a failure to communicate, manipulation 
and engaging in a pattern of obstructive behavior over time; 
(C) ostracizing and ignoring employees; and (D) gossiping or 
spreading rumors about their targets.4 
 
 The effects of workplace harassment include: (i) 
depression; (ii) post-traumatic stress disorder; (iii) prolonged-
duress stress disorder; (iv) alcohol abuse; and (v) suicide. 
Workplace bullying is a risk factor for maintaining mental 
health. The effects of workplace harassment may lead to 
adverse interpersonal and familial consequences; moreover, the 
effects are not just limited to the targets of harassment but also 
impact witnesses to bullying who experience mental stress.5 
The demoralization harassment victims suffer can create toxic 
working environments and impair organizational productivity.6 
 
 Traditionally, workplace harassment has occurred 
through face-to-face verbal and physical acts in the workplace 
environment.7 The traditional notion of the workplace 
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environment continues to expand with changing technology, 
which allows employees to stay connected to the workplace 
environment at locations outside the four walls of the office.8 
These technological advances have also expanded the media 
through which individuals may harass others.9 With the rise in 
the popularity of social media,10 harassment has moved beyond 
the physical boundaries of the workplace to the virtual 
workplace.11 
 
 The rise of workplace harassment in cyberspace is one 
of the most recent examples of the increasing complexity of 
this phenomenon. Workplace harassment law has not kept up 
with this evolution. It has not been adequately updated to 
address the new and amplified practices of workplace 
discrimination. The two principal limitations of the current law 
are: (1) treats only workplace harassment that occurs in certain 
protected settings, such as the physical workplace or school 
setting, as actionable; and (2) assumes that both the act and 
resulting harm of workplace harassment occur in the same 
protected setting. These two limitations make the current 
workplace harassment law unable to address harassment that 
occurs completely or partially outside of the traditionally 
protected settings.12 
 
 In Faragher v. City of Boca Raton13and Burlington 
Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth,14 the U.S. Supreme Court recognized 
that employers are liable under Title VII of the 1964 Civil 
Rights Act for harassment that is sufficiently severe or 
pervasive to alter the employee’s workplace environment. The 
rise in digital media, however, has created a new medium 
through which harassment occurs and the courts are just 
beginning to deal with the issue of whether to consider digital 
media harassment as part of the totality of the circumstances of 
a hostile workplace claim.15 
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 This article argues for a multiple-setting approach to 
dealing with cyberharassment with liability extending to 
website operators. Furthermore, this article argues that the 
courts should examine whether the employer has derived a 
substantial benefit from the digital media forum in order to 
consider whether this digital media forum is an extension of the 
employee’s workplace environment. These frameworks: (1) are 
consistent with the traditional workplace harassment analysis 
under Title VII; (2) recognize the evolving technology in the 
modern workplace; and (3) provide employers with guidance 
on how to maintain an affirmative defense to workplace 
harassment allegations in the digital media age.16 
 
 
II. THE MULTIPLE-SETTING APPROACH TO 
WORKPLACE HARASSMENT 
 
 Workplace cyberharassment causes much harm: victims 
have committed suicide, lost jobs, dropped out of school and 
decreased their participation in employment, educational and 
recreational activities.17 
 
 While cyberharassment creates harm that is equal to or 
even more severe than harassment that occurs in traditionally 
protected spaces, there is no clear legal concept of or remedy 
for cyberharassment. Certain settings are protected under 
traditional harassment law: workplaces under Title VII, schools 
in Title IX and to a lesser extent homes via the Fair Housing 
Act and prisons via the Eighth Amendment. Current law 
requires that the harassment and the effects of that harassment 
occur in the same protected setting. While courts have 
sometimes expanded the concept of protected settings by 
recognizing that the workplace is not limited to physical 
location but the relationships that constitute the employment 
setting, even the most expansive legal view of protected 
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settings leaves cyberharassment outside the purview of 
harassment law.18 
 
 The fact that workplace harassment doctrine has 
developed around a list of single, protected settings means that 
it does not provide a remedy for harassment that occurs in one 
setting and produces consequences in another. Thus, if an 
employee is harassed at her/his workplace by a co-worker, 
manager or even a visitor in a way that significantly interferes 
with her/his ability to function there, s/he has a claim; if s/he is 
harassed by an anonymous stranger on an Internet message 
board with the same effects, s/he does not. The single concept 
of workplace harassment is ill-suited for the realities of the 
Internet age, where harassment occurring in virtual settings can 
have severe effects in traditionally protected employment and 
educational spaces.19 
 
 Recently, the courts have begun to adopt a more 
expansive concept of workplace and school harassment that 
includes cyberharassment.20 
 
 In Blakely v. Continental Airlines, Inc., the New Jersey 
Supreme Court held that an airline could be liable for the 
harassment that occurred on an electronic bulletin board used 
by the pilots of that airline.21 The court held that just because 
the electronic bulletin board was located outside of the 
workplace doesn’t mean that the employer may not have a duty 
to correct off-site harassment by co-workers as conduct that 
takes place outside of the workplace tends to permeate the 
workplace.22 
 
 In J.S. ex rel. H.S. v. Bethlehem Area School District,23 
students created a website where they posted comments about 
their teacher such as “F—k you, Mrs. Fulmer. You are a Bitch. 
You are a Stupid Bitch,” and “Why Should She Die.”24 On 
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another website, there was a sketch of Mrs. Fulmer with her 
head cut off and blood dripping from her neck.25 When Mrs. 
Fulmer saw these websites, she was unable to complete the 
school year and took a medical leave of absence for the 
following year. She testified that she suffers physically and 
emotionally as a result of what the students wrote about her on 
those websites. The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania held that 
this type of substantial disruptive effect justifies control of 
student speech and that the student’s website containing the 
threatening comments about the teacher has a sufficient nexus 
to the school to be considered on-campus.26 
 
 One possible interpretation of these cases is that the 
courts recognize that workplaces and schools, especially in an 
increasingly virtual world, are not just physical locations. 
Workplaces and schools tend to be “sets of social relations of 
power and privilege, which may or may not have a distinct 
geographical nexus.”27 This developing approach provides a 
reasonably sound way of dealing with harassment cases in 
which the harassment occurs “off-site” but produces effects in 
a protected workplace or school setting and is committed by 
individuals with some relationship to the protected setting.28 
 
 Of course, this multiple-setting approach could be seen 
as being unfair to employers in numerous cases. Should 
employers be held liable for all off-site harassment cases just 
because they may produce effects in the workplace and are 
perpetrated by individuals with a connection the employer? If a 
group of employees form their own blog to discuss work and 
decide to make disparaging comments about a certain 
employee, should the employer be liable if those comments 
produce effects in the traditional workplace? There is a 
possible affirmative defense that an employer in this situation 
could raise. 
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III. THE EMPLOYER’S AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE: 
SUBSTANTIAL BENEFIT FROM  
THE DIGITAL MEDIA FORUM 
 
 Currently, there is confusion and a scarcity of case law 
regarding what role evidence of social media harassment 
should have in a workplace harassment claim. The lack of clear 
legal boundaries regarding online media encourages harassers 
to engage in conduct they would have refrained from within the 
physical walls of the workplace.29 Meanwhile, the increased 
integration of social media within our personal and 
professional lives makes it likely that the courts will be 
confronting social media issues with increased frequency.30 
 
 To determine whether harassment over a social media 
site may serve as evidence of a hostile work environment, the 
courts should examine whether the employer derived a 
substantial benefit from this social media site, thereby 
categorizing the site as a digital extension of the employee’s 
workplace environment.31 In these claims, social media 
harassment should be examined under the totality of the 
circumstances of a Title VII hostile work environment claim 
for the purpose of determining employer liability.32 
 
 Although the court in Blakely did not clearly define 
what constitutes a “substantial benefit,” it provided several 
examples of how social media may provide a benefit to an 
employer.33 First, employees’ access to company information 
via social media is a benefit because it improves efficiency.34 
Second, communication between employees via social media 
promotes collaboration, spurs innovation and streamlines 
operations, thereby providing a benefit by reducing costs.35 
Third, the greater the number of current employees using social 
media, the more likely it is that the employer is receiving a 
2015 / Workplace Cyberharassment / 8 
benefit.36 All of these benefits reduce internal transaction 
costs.37 
 
 Based on the substantial benefits test, an employer 
could be held liable for postings on a corporate Facebook page 
since the employer benefits from increasing employee 
communications, encouraging product innovation or 
streamlining operations.38 As the court in Blakely reasoned, 
when the employer receives a substantial benefit from a social 
media forum, such as a corporate Facebook page, the forum is 
sufficiently integrated into the workplace so that it can be 
characterized as an extension of the employer’s workplace 
environment.39 
 
 On the other hand, an employer would not be held 
liable for postings on an employee’s personal Facebook page. 
In this case, the employer is probably not receiving any type of 
economic or personal benefit from the employee’s personal 
Facebook page; therefore the employer is not deriving a 
substantial benefit.40 The employee’s personal Facebook page 
cannot be properly characterized as an extension of the 
workplace environment. 
 
 The substantial benefits analysis is consistent with 
agency principles, which served as the basis of the U.S. 
Supreme Court’s traditional analysis in hostile workplace 
claims.41 In both the Faragher and Ellerth cases, the U.S. 
Supreme Court held employers liable for harassment by 
supervisors and non-supervisors under the aided-in-agency 
theory.42 Under this theory, the employer is liable because the 
agency relationship between the employer and the employee 
enables the employee’s harassment of others in the workplace. 
Without the agency relationship, the harassment could not have 
been committed.43 
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 The substantial benefit argument could serve as an 
affirmative defense for an employer who is being sued for 
workplace harassment on the basis of postings on a social 
media forum. The employer would raise the defense that s/he 
does not derive a substantial benefit from the social media 
forum and therefore the postings on the social media are not an 
extension of the workplace; therefore, the employer would not 
be liable. In situations like this, if the employer is not liable for 
these postings, which could adversely affect the workplace 
environment, who would be? It could be the website operator 
of the social media on which the harassing postings were 
displayed. 
 
 
IV. THE WEBSITE OPERATOR’S LIABILITY FOR 
CYBERHARASSMENT 
 
 The anonymity of the Internet appears to bring out the 
tendencies of certain users to mock and malign others in ways 
they wouldn’t dream of implementing in a “real” or “offline” 
environment.44 Some might say that the best strategy of dealing 
with the insulting behavior that occurs on the Internet is to just 
ignore it. However, when the users attack individuals by name 
with graphic, vicious insults that could interfere with the 
victims’ livelihood or education, ignoring the problem is not a 
viable solution. This type of cyberharassment could be 
categorized as a form of workplace harassment since it could 
adversely affect the way others view and treat the victim in the 
workplace.45 
 
 One of the more famous cases of cyberharassment 
involved AutoAdmit.com, which was a largely unmoderated 
message board where individuals could share information 
about law schools, law school admissions, firms, and how to 
succeed in law school.46 In March 2005, Professor Brian Leiter 
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wrote about AutoAdmit on his blog, Leiter Reports, noting the 
rampant racism and sexism of AutoAdmit posters.47 In March, 
2007, the Washington Post highlighted the numerous racist, 
sexist and obscene posts on AutoAdmit.48 There were posts 
that included entire message threads devoted to ranking female 
students’ bodies as well as discussing their alleged sexual 
activities.49  
 
 In numerous cases, the personal information of these 
students, such as their names, email addresses and instant 
messenger screen names were disclosed. Furthermore, the 
email addresses of their professors and former employers were 
disclosed and site members were encouraged to email their 
insults to these professors and former employers directly.50 A 
number of women knew nothing about these threads until they 
were informed of them by friends or through Google 
searches.51 Some women contacted the AutoAdmit 
administrators and requested that the offensive threads be 
removed.52 An AutoAdmit administrator responded in an 
AutoAdmit post by telling them “Do not contact me … to 
delete a thread.” He warned that if he kept receiving such 
requests, he would post them on the message board for 
everyone to see.53 In response to criticism, the AutoAdmit 
administrators cited First Amendment arguments and claimed 
that the women invited the attention by posting photographs on 
social media sites such as Facebook and MySpace. In some 
cases, the AutoAdmit administrators posted the women’s 
complaints on the site, leading to threads calling the women 
“bitches” and threats to punish them with rape, stalking and 
other abuse.54 
 
 Sites that thrive on gossip and personal insults, such as 
AutoAdmit are numerous.55 The comments sections of many 
online newspapers and blogs are loaded with obscene abuse.56 
Social networking sites such as Facebook have become highly 
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effective media outlets for vengeful individuals to attack ex-
lovers and there are numerous sites devoted to “revenge porn,” 
which is defined generally as homemade porn uploaded by an 
ex-lover after a particularly nasty breakup as a means of 
humiliating that ex-lover.57 
 
 Revenge porn victims are starting to come forward to 
describe the harms they have suffered, including psychological 
damage, stalking and a loss of professional and educational 
opportunities.58 Only now are we beginning to get a sense of 
how large the problem of revenge porn is since more victims 
are telling their stories. The fact that nonconsensual porn often 
involves the Internet and social media, leads the legal system to 
sometimes struggle to understand the mechanics of this type of 
harassment and the devastation it can cause.59 
 
 Cyberharassment is theoretically more responsive to 
control than real-life harassment.60 A number of 
cyberharassment features that magnify the harm of harassment, 
such as instance and permanence, also make this harassment 
easier to regulate. Also, since much cyberharassment is 
recorded and even date- and time-stamped, the evidentiary 
problems that plague real-life harassment are usually not an 
issue with cyberharassment.61 Furthermore, the website 
operators are clearly identifiable agents of effective control 
over sites where cyberharassment takes place; therefore, the 
website operators can control the behavior of users on their 
sites as effectively as employers and school administrators can 
control individuals in their respective real-life environments.62 
 
 It is recommended that website operators should be 
held liable for cyberharassment, since they are the agents with 
effective control over the setting of the harassment.63 Like 
employers and school administrators in Title VII and Title IX 
harassment cases, website operators have the most knowledge 
2015 / Workplace Cyberharassment / 12 
about the harassment. They know how vicious it is and whether 
certain victims are harassed by multiple users; plus, they may 
also have identifying information about the harassers.64 
Futhermore, they have control over the users of their sites. Just 
as employers can fire employees, restrict their behavior or eject 
abusive customers, website operators can warn and even ban 
users who engage in cyberharassment on their sites.65 Finally, 
as a public policy issue, it will encourage website operators to 
create and enforce policies that will discourage 
cyberharassment from occurring in the first place and the 
prevention of harm is better than the mitigation of harm after it 
occurs.66 
 
 In order to hold website operators liable for 
cyberharassment, a change in the language of Section 230 of 
the Communications Decency Act (CDA) would be needed.67 
Section 230(c)(1) states that “no provider or user of an 
interactive computer service shall be treated as the publisher 
or speaker of any information provided by another information 
content provider.”68 This section of the CDA provides 
immunity from liability to providers and users of interactive 
websites who publish information by others.69 Website 
operators are immunized from the unlawful activities of third 
parties. Given that cyberharassment perpetrators are often 
anonymous, the victims of cyberharassment can bring no cause 
of action because there is no party to hold accountable.70 
 
 The immunity provided to website operators is not 
absolute.71 Section 230(e)(1) states: Nothing in this section 
shall be construed to impair the enforcement of section 223 or 
231 of this title, chapter 71 (relating to obscenity) or 110 
(relating to sexual exploitation of children) of title 18, or any 
other Federal criminal statute.72 Section 230(e)(2) states: 
Nothing in this section shall be construed to limit or expand 
any law pertaining to intellectual property. Sections 230(e)(1) 
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and (e)(2) of the CDA provide exceptions for federal criminal 
law and intellectual property law.73 The best way to remove the 
obstacle of Section 230 for cyberharassment cases would be to 
revise it to include express language on compliance with 
federal anti-discrimination law. This amendment could include 
a subsection explaining how website operators, as control 
agents over message boards and sites, can be held liable for 
harassment that produces effects in settings protected by 
current anti-harassment law.74 
 
 Regulating cyberharassment in this way would provide 
a much-needed remedy for a serious harm in addition to 
providing the benefits of relatively low implementation costs, 
low liberty costs75 and a great deterrent.76 In order for the 
website operator to avoid liability for cyberharassment 
perpetrated by others on the website operator’s site, the website 
operator would just have to remove the offending threads from 
the site and ban the user who posted those threads. This remedy 
has the virtue of efficiency. 
 
 
IV. CONCLUSION 
 
 While workplace harassment has been a serious issue 
for many years, the rise of workplace harassment in cyberspace 
demonstrates the increasing complexity of this phenomenon. 
Workplace harassment law has not kept up with the evolution 
of online digital media. The current law treats only workplace 
harassment that occurs in traditionally protected settings such 
as the physical workplace or school environment and assumes 
that the act and harm of workplace harassment both occur in 
the same physical setting. As a result, the current law is unable 
to address harassment that occurs outside of the traditionally 
protected settings. 
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 Since cyberharassment creates harm that is equal to or 
even more severe than real-life harassment, a clear legal 
remedy for cyberharassment is greatly needed. The legal 
system is beginning to realize that workplaces and schools are 
not just physical locations but sets of social relations that may 
or may not have a distinct geographical nexus. Updating 
current workplace harassment law to include the multiple-
setting approach would allow the victims of cyberharassment 
to seek proper redress for any harm they may have suffered. 
 
 To determine whether online harassment may serve as 
evidence of a hostile work environment, the courts should 
examine whether the employer derived a substantial benefit 
from the online site, thereby categorizing this site as an online 
extension of the employer’s workplace. If the employer derives 
no substantial benefit from the site, then this would serve as an 
affirmative defense for the employer. 
 
 In cases where the employer is not liable for 
cyberharassment that can create serious harm in the workplace, 
the website operators could be held liable for such harassment. 
Since website operators are the agents with effective control 
over cyberharassment, they should be held liable for allowing 
such harassment to continue on their sites. The current law that 
provides immunity to website operators of interactive websites 
could be amended to provide a much-needed remedy to those 
whose professional and educational opportunities have been 
limited as a result of cyberharassment. Furthermore, since the 
only action website operators must take in order to avoid 
liability for cyberharassment is to remove the offending threads 
and ban the creators of these threads from the site, the new 
remedy for cyberharassment has the virtue of efficiency.  
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